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BOOKREVIE ··
Should

e Read Carl Schmitt Today?
by
D.A. Jeremy Telman*
Books Reviewed in this Essay
THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMI'IT

Chantal Mouffe ed.; 1999
CARL SCHMI'I*l': THE END OF

LAw

William E. Scheuerman (1999)
LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMI'I"I''S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998
INTRODUCTION

Chantal Mouffe introduces The Challenge of Carl Schmitt by asking, "Why
1
should we read Carl Schmitt today?" How one answers this question depends
on who the "we" is. Mouffe's introduction summarizes approaches to Schmitt
taken in a volume whose authors are political theorists "all identified with the
2
Left." These authors read Schmitt in order to gain "insights that can be used to

*

Associate, Akennan, Senterfitt and Edison, P.A., Miami, Florida. B.A., Columbia University, 1985; Ph.D., Cornell University, 1993; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1999.
I. Chantal Mouffe, Introduction: Schmitt's Challenge [hereinafter Mouffe, Introduction], in
THE CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITI 1 (Chantal M·o uffe ed., 1999) [hereinafter CHALLENGE oF CARL
ScHMITT]. This question has been posed in one form or another by many recent commentators on
the works of Car] Schmitt. See, e.g.; David Dyzenhaus, Introduction: Why Carl Schmitt [hereinafter
Dyzenhaus, Introduction], in LAw AS PoLITics: CARL ScHMrrr' s CRmQuE oF LIBERALISM 1 (David
Dyzenhaus ed., 1998) [hereinafter LAW AS PoLITics]; JoH~ P. McCoRMICK, CARL ScHMrrr's CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 11·15 (1997) (hereinafter McCORMICK,
ScHMITT's CRmQuE) (posing the introductory question: "Liberalism and Fascism - Or, Why Carl
Schmitt?"). The editors of a special iss_ue of the journal TELOs devoted to Carl Schmitt begin their
introduction with, "'Why Schmitt? Why Now?" Paul Piccone and G.L. Ulmen, Introduction to Carl
Schmitt, 72, TELos 3 (1987).
.
2. Mouffe, Introduction, s~pra note 1, at 1. Not all of those who advocate a revival of interest in Schmitt are associated with the political ]eft. Some of Schmitt's current defenders use his
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rethink liberal democracy with a view to strengthening its institutions." In this
essay, I address Mouffe's question from the perspective of a different "we" that of legal scholarship. In answering Mouffe's question, I also tweak it because I think Mouffe's question answers an anterior question that she does not
explicitly pose: in the case of Carl Schmitt, the leading legal theorist for the
4
Third Reich, I believe it is appropriate that we first ask whether we should
bother reading him at all.
In the Anglo-American context, the reception of Schmitt's work has focused on two topics: his influence on Central European leftists, especially the
5
Frankfurt School, and the potential uses to which contemporary theorists might
put his critique of liberalism. The two issues are related: contemporary leftists
now investigate the reasons why leftists of Schmitt's generation were so inter6
ested - and commented so positively - on Schmitt's works. Ellen Kennedy,
whose articles on and translations of Schmitt's work have contributed greatly to
the recent revival of interest in Schmitt, believes she has discovered the source
of earlier interest in Schmitt's work, arguing that "the most cogent and coherent
7
critique of liberal institutions in this century was developed by Schmitt. " According to Kennedy, Schmitt's legal and political theory filled a gap in left-wing
writings to attack the political left. G.L. Ulmen, for example, takes to task the American authors of
recent books critical of Schmitt, attributing their hostility to Schmitt to the "existential anxiety ... of
many trying to remain on the 'Left' after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular, and communism, in general." According to Ulmen, their criticisms of Schmitt resort to recycled versions of
liberalism, social democracy, and anti-fascism. G.L. Ulmen, {(Integrative Jurisprudence" and Other
Misdemeanors, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1107, 1108 (1999) (reviewing PETER CARL CALDWELL, PoPULAR
SovEREIGNTY AND ruE CRISIS oF GERMAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE THEORY AND PRAcncE OF
WEIMAR CoNsTITUTIONALISM (1997)); DAVID DvzENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL
ScHMI'I"t, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) {hereinafter DYZENHAus, LEGALITY AND LEGmMACY ]. Ellen Kennedy now enthusiastically reviews books that are critical of
Schmitt, see Ellen Kennedy, The Politics of Law in Weimar Germany, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1079, 108492 ( 1999) (praising CALDWELL, supra, and DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, supra, as "exciting, intelligent and provocative books") [hereinafter Kennedy, The Politics of Law]. However,
her first major essay on Carl Schmitt was received as an attack on the left-wing Frankfurt School.
Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, 71 TELos 37 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Carl Schmitt]. The responses published in the same issue include: Martin Jay, Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Rejoinder to Kennedy 71 TELOS 67 ( 1987); Alfons So liner, Beyond Carl Schmitt: Political Theory in the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 81 ( 1987); Ulrich K. PreuB, The Critique of German
Liberalism: Reply to Kennedy, 71 TELOS 97 (1987). Kennedy responded, Ellen Kennedy, Carl
Schmitt and the Frankfurt School: A Rejoinder, 73 TELOS 101 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Rejoinder].
3. Mouffe, Introduction, supra note 1, at 1.
4. ANDRES KoENEN, DER FALL CARL ScHMin, SEIN AUFSTIEG zuM "KRoNJURISTEN DES
DRITTEN REICHEs" (1995); JosEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL ScHMirr: THEORIST FOR THE REICH
(1983).
5. The debate in the United States about the extent of Schmitt's influence on the Frankfurt
School began in earnest with Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2. TELOS has since become the
major source for new translations of Schmitt and for new English-language commentaries on his
writings.
6. Kennedy notes Schmitt's influence on Walter Benjamin, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, and Jiirgen Habennas, all associated with the Frankfurt School. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt,
supra note 2. Ulmen emphasizes Haberrnas' recognition of Schmitt as a "legitimate pupil" of Max
Weber. Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1127-28.
7. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 39.
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theory, supplementing the economic and social theory of Karl Marx by analyz1
ing the condition of the liberal state under 20 h-century capitalism. 8
But the revival of interest in Schmitt is somewhat mysterious, especially as
so many of the theorists who now advocate a reappraisal of his significance
9
stress that they abhor his politics and reje.c t his conclusions. Indeed, Schmitt's
perspective on liberalism is unusual because his opposition to modem mass
politics and parliamentary democracy enables him to be utterly merciless in his
attacks on the assumptions, the aspirations, and the techniques of the modem
liberal state. Moreover, the sudden rush to Schmitt remains puzzling because
other Gennan legal positivists of the Weimar era offered equally searching critiques of liberalism. Hans Kelsen, the most influential legal positivist of that era,
did so from a centrist position. Herman Heller drew on the German social democratic tradition in his analysis of the political structures of Gern1any' s first parliamentary democracy. The revival of interest in Schmitt is thus encouraging
not as an end in itself but as an indication of a new openness among North
American scholars to the German legal positivist tradition.
The first part of this essay is divided into three sections. Part I begins by
outlining Schmitt's biography and tracing his intellectual and professional development. It then assesses Schmitt's place in the context of German legal theory in the first half of the 20th century. It concludes by recounting the unlikely
re-emergence of Schmitt as a political and legal theorist whose work is touted
for its critique of political liberalism.
Part II returns to the question of whether we should read Carl Schmitt today
and what useful lessons we might derive from his writings. This Part details the
various reasons the writers under review here have given for Schmitt's continued relevance. 10 While the articles collected in lLlW as Politics generally assess
Schmitt's importance as a historical figure and his continuing impact on Gertnan
.

.

.

8. ld. at 41-42. In the second part of his book, entitled "Carl Schmitt in America,"
Scheuerman devotes three chapters to a discussion of the diffusion of Carl Schmitt's ideas into
American political theory through the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich A. Hayek, and Hans
Morgenthau. WILLIAM E. ScHEUERMAN, CARL ScHMn"l': THE END OF LAW 181-251 (1999). While
this part of'Scheuennan's book begins the very important work of assessing Schmitt's actual influence and importance, it is the least convincing part of his work on Schmitt, based as it must be on
tenuous biographical connections, inferences drawn from the availability of Schmitt's writings and
topical affinities, and the fine art of divining influence. See e.g., id. at 197-98 (demonstrating the
existence of a connection between Schmitt and Schumpeter, but not demonstrating the extent of
Schmitt's influence). John P. McCormick interprets Scheuerman's work as an attempt to "explicate
[the] subterranean relationship between liberalism and fascism ...., McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 14. McConnick thus provides an additional ground for reviving S-c hmitt, but
even Scheuennan does not really seem to be interested in showing a fundamental theoretical affinity
between liberalism and fascism. Rather~ Scheuettnan indicates the need to investigate the extent to
which liberal theory might be indebted to Schmitt so that liberals can be· on guard against the implications of Schmittian theory.
9. See discussion infra accompanying notes 111-14, of the views of some of the contributors
to both THE CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITT and LAw AS POLITICS.
10. In discussing the two collections of essays, I have focused on the question of Schmitt's
relevance to contemporary political and legal theory. Accordingly, I devote relatively little space to
the essays included in those collections that address other aspects of Schmitt's writings or assess his
relationship to other thinkers.
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politics and constitutional law, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt argues for the
more general applicability of Schmitt's critique of Rawlsian political liberalism.
Scheuennan takes an entirely different approach in Carl Schmitt: The End of·
Law, focusing on Schmitt's critique of liberalism for its inability to justify the
government's use of discretionary power in realms where legal nortns underdetermine the outcome of particular conflicts. Scheuennan shows Schmitt's
importance in the context of the contemporary Atnerican critique of liberal jurisprudence, which has often focused on the failure of constitutional democracy to
achieve its aim of guaranteeing the functioning of a rational, predictable legal
system that provides equal justice for all.
In what follows, I fault Mouffe and some of the authors she includes in The
Challenge of Carl Schmitt for positing Schmitt's importance as a political theorist rather than demonstrating that importance. Dyzenhaus' collection, by contrast, is far more convincing in showing Schmitt's importance in Gennan
constitutional history and the continuing impact of his thought on Gennan constitutional theory and on German politics. Scheuerman, as well as many of the
authors collected in Law as Politics, argues that Schmitt is best read as an object
lesson - as a dramatic example of the dangers of sacrificing liberal democracy
for stability and order. I share their assessment, as well as their conclusion that
Schmitt is most usefully read in conjunction with Hans Kelsen, Hennann Heller,
11
Rudolf Smend, and Schmitt's other interlocutors from the Weimar period.
These other Weimar thinkers developed their legal theories in the face of the
same problems that Schmitt confronted. Their conclusions are equally instructive for contemporary theory, and they, unlike Schmitt, chose to support democracy over fascism.
I.
WHO wAS CARL SCHMITI'

A.

A Brief Biographical Sketch

As discussions of Carl Schmitt's scholarship focus on the varying accounts
of the significance of Schmitt's collaboration with Nazism to an assessment of
his writings, Schmitt's biography is only slightly less controversial than those
writings. Schmitt was born in 1888 in a small town in the German Rhineland;
12
he died in the same small town in 1985.
He earned his law degree in 1910
and, in 1914, completed his Habilitationschrift, a post-doctoral dissertation that
qualifies its author for an academic career. Schmitt thus received his training
during the heyday of legal positivism, which thrived in the Gern1an universities
13
of the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic. He worked for Germany's military government at the end of World War I and then taught at leading Gern1an
universities during the 1920s. By the end of that decade, Schmitt had become a
11. Unfortunately, the writings of these authors are largely unavailable in English. Kelsen's
legal theory is available, however, in HANS l<ELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
THEORY (B.L Paulson and S.L. Paulson trans., 1992).
12. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 2.
13. BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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leading legal advisor to the authoritarian governments that oversaw the collapse
of the Weimar Republic. Later, Schmitt defended the actions of Chancellor
Franz von Papen, who seized control of the Prussian government in July 1932,
in a sort of coup d'etat (the "Preuj3enschlag") in which the federal government
displaced the elected Social-Democratic leaders of Germany's largest state.
Schmitt's support of von Papen;s coup set the stage for one of those rare
occasions when legal theorists face off in a high-stakes game of power politics.
The legality of von Papen's actions were tested before the German Supreme
Court in Leipzig. Although Kelsen did not participate in the proceedings, his
writings clearly shaped the arguments put forward by Hans Nawiasky, one of
14
the lawyers representing the ousted Prussian government.
Hermann Heller
15
also represented Prussia.
In support of von Papen's government, Schmitt argued that Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution empowered the President (and
the Chancellor acting under emergency powers granted him by the President) to
take extreme measures in order to check radical political parties. The Supreme
Court was not entirely convinced, but it did not reinstate the independent Prossian government.-16 Since the Social Democratic government of Prussia had
provided a significant bulwark against the rise of Nazism,. historians often point
to the PreujJenschlag as a critical turning point in the Weimar Republic's
demise.
Schmitt did not join the Nazi Party until May 1933, as his natural political
17
inclinations favored a more old-fashioned authoritarianism.
Soon after joining
14.

PREU8EN CONTRA REICH VOR OEM STAATSGERICHTSHOF: STENOGRAMM.B ERICHT DER VER-

10. BJS 14. UNO VOM 17. 0KTOBER
1932 (2nd ed. 1976). See BENDERSKY, supra note 4t at 160-71 (discussing Schmitt's role and Kelsen's influence on the proceedings); CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 172-73 (same); Kennedy, The
Politics of Lawt supra note 2, at 1084-92 (summarizing Dyzenhaus' account of the proceedings and
concluding that only Heller's theories provided a means of preserving the Weimar constitution).
15. Kennedy, The Politics of Law, supra note 2, at 1086.
16. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 37-38, n. 2. G.L. Ulmen criticizes Peter Carl
Caldwell and David Dyzenhaus for treating Schmitt as an ally of von Papen when Schmitt was
actually associated with Kurt von Schleicher, s authoritarian attempt to exclude the Nazis from government Ulrnen, supra note 2, at lllJ, 1118, 1124. However, Ulmen does not address Schmitt's
role in defending von Papen' s actions before the Gennan Supreme Court.
17. George Schwab, one of Schmitt's translators, argues rather pathetically that Carl Schmitt
could not have shared the ideas of the Nazis in 1932 because at that point, as an advisor to Germany's existing authoritarian government, he advocated the exclusion of extremists on both ends of
the political spectrum from participation in politics. Schwab, Introduction, in CARL ScHMnT, THE
CONCEPT OF THE PoLITICAL 14, n. 28 (George Schwab trans.,. 1996) [hereinafter SCHMI'IT, THE CoNCEPT] .. Schmitt was thus disappointed that President Paul von Hindenburg "labored under the impact
of legalist doctrines," and would not "eliminate the political challenges" facing his government. /d.
at 15. While this does indicate that Schmitt favored traditional forms of authoritarian government
over Nazi-style totalitarianism, it by no means indicates that Schmitt's ideas could not be reconciled
with those of the Nazis. Schmitt believed that states had to be empowered to make vital decisions in
times of crisis in the interest of stability. In 1932, Schmitt believed that the state needed to eliminate
fascists and ,c ommunists from the political spectrum. In 1933, he believed that the Nazi state needed
to eliminate its enemies, right, left and center. Scheuennan adopts a slightly more generous view
regarding Schmitt's association with Nazism, arguing that Schmitt's authoritarian theory of the total
state "made him vulnerable: to National Socialism." S.C HEUERMAN, supra note 8, ,at 86. But
Scheuennan also argues that '' 'Schmitt's marriage to Nazism stems immanently from core elements
of his jurisprudence." ld. at 115 (emphasis in original). Schwab also argues that Schmitt's antiSemitic remarks were insincere; that he· was merely attempting to ingratiate himself with the Nazis.
HANDLUNGEN VOR OEM STAATSGERICHTSHOF IN LEIPZIG VOM
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the Nazi Party, however, Schmitt was awarded a professorship at Gertnany's
leading university in Berlin, as well as the editorship of Germany's leading legal
18
Schmitt's collaboration with the
publication, Die deutsche Juristen-Zeitung.
19
Nazis was short-lived, lasting from March 1933 until December 1936. Consequently, some of those who advocate Schmitt's continued importance urge us
not to judge the work of a prolific theorist whose thought continued to develop,
beginning around the time of World War I and continuing into the Space Age,
20
on the basis of one 45-month period. But during that time Schmitt authored
21
four books and published over 50 essays in academic and political joumals.
Moreover, Schmitt was a reactionary critic of the Weimar Republic long before
he joined the Nazi Party, and, although his feud with elements within the Nazi
leadership forced him to surrender some of his positions, Schmitt's writings up
until 1945 do not bear out his post-war claims that he had joined the opposition
22
As Scheuerman puts it, "[t]he overwhelming tone of Schmitt's
after 1936.
GEORGE ScHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE ExcEPTION: AN lNTRonucnoN TO THE PoLITICAL IDEAS
OF CARL SCHMITI' BETWEEN 1931 AND 1936, 134-38 (1970).
18. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 113.
19. Paul Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism [hereinafter Hirst, Schmitt's Decisionism], in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMnT, supra note 1, at 7-8. Hirst's essay is an updated version of an article he
published in Telos 12 years earlier. Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism, 72 TELOS 15 (1987). After
December, 1936, Schmitt was forced out of several of his positions after he was criticized in an
official SS publication, Das Schwarze Korps. Tracy Strong, Foreward: Dimensions of the New
Debate around Carl Schmitt, in ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at ix-x. The story of
Schmitt's fall into disfavor with elements of the SS is recounted in BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 230242. In the original Gern1an version of her essay on Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, Kennedy described Schmitt's association with Nazism as a mere "caprice." Jay, supra note 2, at 72
(criticizing Kennedy, Schwab, and Bendersky for attempting to redeem Schmitt as a brilliant conservative theorist by distinguishing his Weimar writings from those written during the Third Reich).
20. Ulmen accuses Dyzenhaus and Caldwell of distorting Schmitt's writings by finding too
much continuity in his thought. Thus Ulmen finds it significant that, during the Weimar Republic,
Schmitt did not write about the importance of a mythical leader who could resolve social conflicts in
industrial society. Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1112, 1118. Ulmen would distinguish Schmitt's views
from Nazism because his crucial friend/enemy distinction was not explicitly racial and his racism
was not biological. ld. at 1109, n. 10.
21. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 113. These writings included crude attacks on Jews and
foreigners and enthusiastic defenses of the racial Nuremberg laws. ld. at 113-14.
22. /d. at 1, 4. Some commentators prefer to divide Schmitt's career into three distinct periods: the Schmitt of the teens and twenties, the Schmitt of the Nazi period, and the post-Nazi Schmitt.
Agostino Carrino, Carl Schmitt and European Juridical Science, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMITT,
supra note 1, at 180, 186. While there were undeniable shifts in the focus of Schmitt's work
throughout his career, I believe that Schmitt's writings generally evidence the continuity of his
thought. Carrino acknowledges this continuity with respect to Schmitt's legal writings. Id. at 187.
See also, Strong, supra note 19, at xxv ("It seems to me relatively clear that in most aspects of his
thought Schmitt's understanding of law and the world did not change throughout his life. This
includes at least some aspects of his open anti-Semitism during the period 1933-1936."); Jean-Fran~ois Kervegan, Carl Schmitt and "World Unity", in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMI'IT, supra note 1, at
54, 55-56 (noting that Schmitt began developing the major themes of his post-war writings as early
as the 1920s). Ingeborg Maus argues that Schmitt consistently advocated the same sort of social
function for the political system, while acknowledging "situation-specific modifications of Schmitt's
juristic constructs." Ingeborg Maus, The 1933 "Breakt' in Carl Schmitt's Theory, in LAw AS PoLITIcs, supra note 1, at 196, 199. She concludes that "Schmitt's theory coincides with the interest of
those parts of the bourgeoisie that did not autonomously bring fascism into existence in 1933, but
that for a long time successfully used fascism for its own purposes, only to be cheated by it in the
long run." /d. at 212. John P. McCorn1ick argues that there was a break in Schmitt's theory of
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postwar writings is fundamentally unrepentant. Schmitt's recently published di23
aries document the depth of his anti-Semitism well after the Nazi defeat."
In
any case, as I indicate below, Schmitt is read today precisely for his writings of
the '20s and '30s, the period when he was most engaged in advocating the replacement of Germany's existing parliamentary democracy with a dictatorship.
Whether or not his brief association with Nazism defines Schmitt's career, it
certainly defines that portion of his career during which he generated the writings that are today celebrated for their critique of liberalism.

B.
1.

Schmitt's Place in German Legal Theory

The Positivist Tradition

Legal positivism has never enjoyed widespread favor in this country, but
our rejection of the legal positivist tradition has lacked nuance. In his extremely
useful book on German legal theory, Peter Carl Caldwell distinguishes the German tradition of statutory positivism from sociological positivism, which links
24
law to a community's social practices, and from H.L.A. Hart's statist positivism,25 which identifies law with nonns posited by legal authority or produced
26
through legal procedures. For statutory positivists, a statute, duly approved by
the legislature, is the highest expression of the sovereign will. So long as legislation reflects the will of a sovereign body formed in confortnity with constitutional nonns, the legislation establishes legal nortns that stand above the
constitution. Gertnan legal positivism first emerged as a means of justifying the
legal authoritarianism of Bismarck's Kaiserreich, but the leading practitioners of
legal positivism during the Weimar Republic supported the Republic, although
27
with varying degrees of conviction.
dictatorship. But that break occurred very early, between 1921 and 1922. Compare CARL ScHMnT,
DIE DIKTATUR: VoN DEN ANFANGEN DES MODERNEN SOUVERANITATSGEDANKENS BIS ZUM
PRoLETARISCHEN KLASSENKAMPF (1921) [hereinafter ScHMITI", DIE DIKTATUR], with CARL
ScHMt'l"r, PoLJTISCHE THEoLooiE: VIER KAPITEL ZUR LEHRE voN DER SoURVERANITAT (1922) [here·
inafter ScHMnT, PoLmSCHE THEOLOGIE]. The effect of the break, according to McCorntick, was to
transfonn Schmitt from a "brilliant Weimar conservative" into a "Weimar fascist." John P. McCormick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers [hereinafter McConnick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship], in LAw AS PoLITICS, supra note 1, at 217, 236. See
discussion infra accompanying notes 168-175. Ulmen and Bendersky argue for a different kind of
continuity in Schmitt's thought, treating him as a conservative, never a fascist, throughout his career.
Ulmen, supra note 2, at 1115; Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolution,
72 TELOS 27 (1987).
23. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 175.
24. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMANN, LAw AND sociETY: AN lNTR.ooucr1oN 3-5 (1977) (setting
out, as the object of the sociology of law, the authoritative description of public rules).
25. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT oF LAw (1961).
26. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 3.
27. See e.g., id. at 65 (discussing Gerhard Achschutz's evolution from a defender of constitutional monarchism into one of the most important commentators on the Weimar constitution and the
laws of the Weimar Republic), 123 ("It took at least ten years for [Rudolf] Smend to become reconciled to the Weimar Republic."), 129-30 (noting in Heller's attempt to articulate a social democratic
politics of nationalism a tendency to adopt uncritically biological notions of race and suspicion of
internationalism, both associated with the anti-democratic forces in Weimar).
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Legal positivism generally rejects the theory, based in natural law, that
grounds legal norms within a larger moral norn1ati ve system. The challenge for
German legal positivism was to justify existing legal norms without subordinating those norms to universalizing moral claims. Hans Kelsen, the Austrian legal
theorist whose writings dominated Gertnan legal theory during the Weimar Republic, acknowledged this difficulty by positing the existence of certain basic
legal norms which, while not dependent for their existence on moral norms,
28
In the United States, Kelsen's theory
could be subjected to moral critique.
failed political litmus tests because, although Kelsen personally supported parliamentary democracy, his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him
to avoid connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory. Unable to reconcile the privileging of a particular political perspective with the radical epistemological relativism that informed all of his work, Kelsen created a
system in which the legal constraints on state action are purely formaL Any
action by a state official is valid so long as the official was authorized to take
29
that action. Of course, such action can still be subjected to external norn1ative
critique, but Kelsen' s theory did not seem to American legal theorists to provide
a sufficiently robust defense of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against
abuses of the law by fascist or totalitarian governments.
Schmitt took a very different .approach from Kelsen, grounding legal norms
in the existence of a unified, homogeneous people. Schmitt rejected Kelsen's
complex system of legal rules balanced within the bounds of potential external
normative critique and replaced it in his own theoretical system with an act of
30
popular will.
Schmitt stood out .among his contemporaries through his strenuous advocacy of the establishment of legal detenninacy by a homogenous judici31
His commitment to
ary committed to the stability of the existing state.
homogeneity was no mere theoretical stance, for he endorsed the expulsion of
Jews and political radicals from the Gerrrtan civil service and advocated a simi32
lar ethnic cleansing within the ranks of German jurists. Despite his collaboration with the Nazis, however, Schmitt was no simple-minded racist or
nationalist, and both his peers and contemporary theorists recognize that Schmitt
had a keen eye for the vulnerabilities of modem parliamentary democracy. A
further exploration of the main themes of Schmitt's political theory is required
in order to render comprehensible the attraction of this anti-democratic thinker
to contemporary theorists interested in criticizing liberal political theory .
•

2.

Schmitt's Central Themes

As a young adult, Schmitt witnessed the destruction of both his generation
and the dynasty to which he had sworn allegiance during the First World War.
28. See id. at 88-96, 116 (providing a synthetic overview of Kelsen' s explication of the basic
no·...,...nn).
29. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at 11.
30. See CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 1 16-18.
31. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 10-11.
32. /d. at 17 (citing CARL ScHMITT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, VoLK: DIE DREIOLIEDERUNG DER
PouTISCHEN EINJ-IEIT 45 (1933)) [hereinafter ScHMJIT, STAAT, BEwEGUNG, VoLK].
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It is thus not surprising that his writings consistently reveal an obsession with
order and a commitment to the preservation of the security of the existing
33
state.
After World War II, Schmitt turned his attention to global political is34
sues and his thought expanded to encompass even broader topics.
For the
purposes of this essay, however, I shall focus on the central themes of Schmitt's
early writings, those that have attracted the attention of contemporary political
35
and legal theorists.
Most contemporary commentators on Schmitt focus on his critique of liber36
alism and his rejection of pluralism.
By "pluralism," Schmitt means the theories of society that focus on the multiplicity of associations that any particular
individual might value. For Schmitt, only the state can serve as the decisive and
37
sovereign association.
What distinguishes the state from other forms of social
organization, and what makes it a uniquely political entity, is its authority to
decide that an enemy exists and that it must be fought with all of the society's
38
resources.
By contrast, a political association whose unity consists of an agglomeration of changing alliances among heterogeneous groups yields a constitutional ethic that, according to Schmitt, must eventually dwindle to the
39
proposition pacta sunt servanda [contracts must be observed].
Such a political association is based on a simple contract, and when that contract is breached,
40
the result must be civil war.
The quintessential political distinction for Schmitt is that between friend
and enemy. When states fail to make that distinction, other inequalities come to
the fore, since there will always be some form of inequality in a group of people.41 Thus the community is ultimately divided against itself if it does not unite
against its enemies. "Political unity is the highest unity ... because it decides,
and has the potential to prevent all other opposing groups from dissociating into
33~

BENDERSKY, supra note 4, at 19.
34. CARL ScHMnT, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGiE II. DIE LEGENDE voN DER ERLEDIGUNG JEDER
PouTISCHEN THEOLOGIE (1970); CARL ScHMITT, DER NoMos DER ERnE IM V6LKERRECHT DES Jus
PuBLICUM EuROPAEUM (1950). For an overview of Schmitt's post-war thought, see Kervegan, supra
note 22.
35. The majority of the works by Schmitt that have been recently translated into English date
from the 1920s and 1930s. These translations must be credited with a major role in the revival of
interest in Schmitt in the English-speaking academic world. The most significant translations include CARL ScHMnT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans.,. 1996)
(1923) [hereinafter ScHMTIT CRISis); CARL SCHMnT, PoLITICAL RoMANTICISM (Guy Oakes trans.,
1985) (1925) [hereinafter ScHMIIT, POLITICAL RoMANTICISM]; CARL ScHMITI, PoLmCAL THEOLOGY (George Schwab trans., 1985) (1922) [hereinafter ScHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY]; ScHMnT,
THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17.
36. Schmitt's analysis of pluralism is developed in Carl Schmitt, Ethic of State and Pluralistic
State (David Dyzenhaus trans.) [hereinafter Schmitt, Ethic of State]; in CHALLENGE oF CARL
ScHMnT, supra note 1, at 195.
37. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 41-42.
38. /d. at 45. According to Schmitt, a family or the head of a household may also be empowered to make life or death decisions about members of that family or household, but only a state can
make the decision that an enemy of the community must die. /d. at 47.
39. Schmitt, Ethic of State, supra note 36, at 207.
40. '~In the background of this kind of contractual ethic, an ethic of civil war always lurks."
/d..
41. ScHt..-nrr, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMI'IT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 13.
1
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Accordingly, the power to
a state of extreme enmity- that is, into civil war."
authorize war is the essence of Schmitt''s state. Schmitt justifies the recourse to
war in straightforward, amoral terms: a state does not enter a war in order to
further moral, economic, or religious principles. War is a response to an exis43
tential threat to the state and its people.
Schmitt's focus on the power to authorize war must be understood in the
context of his theories of sovereignty and democracy. Schmitt's model of democracy is, at best, plebiscitary, drawing on Rousseau's concept of the general
will, but stressing that a minority may well express ''the true will of the people. " 44 The people cannot be expected to form policy; they can only perform
acts of acclimation, vote yes or no to questions posed to them by the sovereign.45 Schmitt did not consider parliamentarism to be a form of democracy
46
because members of parliament are not directly answerable to the people.
Consequently, parliament does not always embody the popular will, and it cannot speak for the people in the way that Schmitt's ideal sovereign can.
Schmitt's theory of sovereignty is linked to his theory of decisionism - that
is, his focus on the moment of crisis when the sovereign makes a crucial decision and, in exercising its will, removes from the populace not only other possi47
ble choices, but the very possibility of choices.
As Schmitt put it in the
opening sentence of his 1922 work, Political Theology, "[s]overeign is he who
48
decides on the exception.'' Schmitt's focus on the importance of the strong
and irrevocable act of political will makes sense in the context of Gennany's
first attempt at parliamentary republicanism, an attempt that teetered colorfully
on the brink of disaster for the entirety of its brief existence. Having struggled,
along with others, to provide the fledgling Weimar Republic with a legal theory
that could guarantee its stability, Schmitt arrived at the conclusion that the Sovereign needed, in certain situations, to become the exception that cannot be
49
bound by law.
Like J.G. Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, G.W.F. Hegel and the German
social scientists whom they influenced, Schmitt takes state-building to be the
42. Schmitt, Ethic of State, supra note 36, at 203.
43. "If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to
one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified.'; ScHMn"l', CRISIS, supra note 35; at 49. Schmitt's
rhetoric clearly reflects Gerrnan disappointment with the punitive Versailles Treaty and what
Gennans regarded as the hollow pieties of President Wilson's rhetoric during World War I.
44. ld. at 27.
45. Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 50 (citing Otto Kirchheimer, Constitutional Reaction in
1932, in PoLmcs, LAw, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED EssAYS oF Orro KlRCHHEIMER 78 (Frederic S. Burin & Kurt L. Shell eds., 1969)).
46. ScHMnT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 34.
47. Mouffe, Introduction., supra note 1.. at 4-5.
48. ScHMITI", PoLmcAL THEOLOGY, supra note 35, at 5. The Gennan version reads,
"Souverail ist, wer iiber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet." ScHMITt, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGIE,
supra note 22, at ll. George Schwab's translation makes sense in the context of Schmitt's political
theory, which plays on the literal meaning of the Gennan word for "state of emergency," Ausnahmezustand, which literally .m eans ''state of exception."
49. CARL ScHMITT, PoLmCAL THEORY 5-15 (George Schwab trans., 1985).

2001]

SHOULD WE READ CARL SCHMITT TODAY?

key development of modem European history.

137

50

The influence of Hegelian
thought is especially pronounced in Schmitt's treatment of the state as the indi51
vidual expression of a particular people. As he put it famously in the opening
line of The Concept of the Political, ''[t]he concept of the state presupposes the
52
concept of the political;" the state can only exist where a cohesive political
community exists.
Although Schmitt would allow the state to act outside the law only in exceptional circumstances where such actions were necessary in order to ensure
political stability, his theory is incompatible with liberalism because, for
Schmitt, the sovereign state's power to engage in exceptional, extra-legal acts is
53
its very essence.
Furthennore, Schmitt's definition of politics is inextricably
linked to the possibility of exceptional state action. "What always matters is the
possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision
54
whether this situation has or has not arrived."
Specifically, to Schmitt, war discloses the essence of every political idea:
55
the distinction between friend and enemy. In most circumstances, he consid56
ers wars motivated by religion, morality, law or economics to be ''senseless."
57
The political may "derive its energy" from one of these antitheses, but if an
antithesis is strong enough to divide people into opposed groups of friends and
8
enemies, it is transformed into the political. 5 But if the political does not consist of some combination of these antitheses, how does a society tell its friends
from its enemies? In order to give some content to his concept of the political,
Schmitt needs to describe the nature of the community that unites against a foe,
59
but he is elusive on this point.
Drawing on classical and religious sources,
Schmitt argues for the importance of the distinction between private and public
60
enemies, between inimicus and hostis.
The New Testament, according to
Schmitt, told us to love our private enemies, not marauding Saracens and
On the state-centered Gern1an tradition of political theory, see LEoNARD KRIEGER, THE
GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM (1973).
51. "In its literal sense and in its historical appearance the state is a specific entity of a people." ScHMIIT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 19.
52. /d. at 19. George Ananiadis, in his contribution to Mouffe's collection, presents the interesting thesis that Schmitt's concept of the political derives from his concept of sovereignty.
Ananiadis thus calls into question one of the fundamental building blocks of Schmitt's theory. See
Grigoris Ananiadis, Carl Schmitt and Max Adler: The Irreconcilability of Politics and Democracy,
in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMTIT, supra note 1, at 118.
53. As John McCormick has shown, after 1922, Schmitt's political theory tended to justify
permanent dictatorship by blurring the lines between exception and normal circumstances. See discussion infra accompanying notes 168·175.
54. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 35.
50.

55.
56.

57.
58.

/d.
/d. at 36.
/d. at 38.
/d. at 37. The Crusades were thus political, not religious wars for Schmitt. /d. at 48.

59. "The question of what this substantial homogeneity should consist of is deliberately left
open. One may think of common tradition, language, ethnic origin, religion, or ideology." Heiner
Bielefeldt, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstruction and Countercriticism,
in LAw AS PoLmcs, supra note I, at 27.
60. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC V:XVI, 470).
See also Ellen Kennedy, Hostis Not lnimicus: Towards a Theory of the Public in the Work of Carl
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In short, the essence of the political for Schmitt is that people fonn
Turks.
national groupings. Enmities inevitably arise among these groupings, and the
state exists so that national groupings can protect themselves via warfare when
their national existence is threatened. However, Schmitt never specifies the
sources of national unity. He merely emphasizes the need for homogeneity.
Schmitt's insistence on homogeneity is one of the more alarming aspects of
his approach to politics. His notion of homogeneity differs from the blood62
based racism of the Nazis and their volkisch forerunners, but it may be just as
sinister. For Schmitt, functioning democracy requires an existential unity of individuals who can work together as one political unit. Since the 19th century, he
63
notes, national homogeneity has been the basis of that existential unity.
Schmitt thus recognized that it might at times be necessary for a polity to ex64
clude heterogeneous elements. "A democracy demonstrates its political power
by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that
threatens its homogeneity." 65 Enemies tend to be foreigners for Schmitt, but, as
his later career would demonstrate, an enemy can also be a fellow national
whose political ideas are considered a threat to the state.
Accordingly, Schmitt rejected liberalism as a political system in which individual rights are prized and government is limited, and he rejected liberalism
as a cultural system that prefers compromise to conflict and privileges individual
66
interests over the group. In his view, liberals do not understand the essence of
politics, that is, that "[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions
67
and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy."
One may
debate or compete with enemies, but Schmitt's concept of the political enemy
emphasizes the ''ever-present possibility of combat."68 Schmitt is not being
metaphorical: "The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. " 69
One does not compromise with enemies; one seeks their annihilation.
Schmitt, in LAw As PoLITICS, supra note 1, at 92, 101-04 (stressing that the distinction between
friend and enemy in Schmitt's work is always a public matter).
61. ScHMITT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 29 (citing Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27).
62. In fact, the Nazi law professor, Otto Koellreutter, attacked Schmitt on the ground that his
theories lacked the proper biological and volkisch foundations. See Orro KoELLREU ITER, YoLK UNO
STAAT IN DER WELTANSCHAUUNG DES NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 6-11 (1935).
63. Schmitt, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMn-r, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9.
64. See, e.g., id. at 14 (adapting Rousseau and arguing that those who do not belong to the
nation must be excluded from the polity). Ulrich PreuB credibly argues that Schmitt's notion of
homogeneity still exercises some influence over German constitutional discussions; for example, in
debates regarding the eligibility of long-tenn non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. Ulrich
K. PreuB, Political Order and Democracy: Carl Schmitt and His Influence, in CHALLENGE OF CARL
ScHMrn·, supra note 1, at 171.
65. ScHMITT, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9.
66. See McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 6 (stating his thesis that Schmitt
associated this type of liberalism with the use of technology as a neutral force that suppresses the
political).
67. ScHMIIT, THE CoNcEPT, supra note 17, at 26.
68. /d. at 32.
69. /d. at 33.
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Schmitt contrasted his concept of the political with liberal pluralism, which
70
he associated with "political romanticism. "
The political romantic places
nothing above her own individual interests and thus preserves an ironic detachment from any serious political engagement. Political romantics engage in the
endless discussion and formation of committees that are the essence, for
71
They do this because they confuse politics with ecoSchmitt, of liberalism.
nomics and debate. They treat political opponents as competitors or as worthy
72
adversaries, and they attempt to adopt a neutral standpoint in the face of relig73
ious, ideological, and political conflicts.
Schmitt also associated liberalism with parliamentarism- and, in his major
work on the subject, he attributed the failure of modem parliamentary govern74
ments to the incompatibility of liberalism and parliamentary democracy.
The
tension between liberalism and parliamentarism derives from that between
75
Liberalism values the former over the latter, and by
equality and democracy.
seeking to level all differences within a population, it ultimately blinds itself to
the one difference that for Schmitt really matters, the distinction between friend
and enemy. Schmitt insisted that equality is always achieved by establishing an
attendant inequality, but a democracy "can exclude one part of those governed
76
Schmitt thus considered universal sufwithout ceasing to be a democracy."
77
frage to be a liberal, not a democratic idea, and he treated Bolshevism and
78
fascism as anti-liberal but not necessarily anti-democratic movements.
Schmitt attacked not only the idea of liberal parlimentarism but also its
79
practice. One of the central themes of his Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy
is the extent to which parliamentarism no longer conforn1s to the principles it
80
Assuming a position that has endeared him to the political left,
espouses.
Schmitt viewed liberal parliamentarism as a means of safeguarding the interests
of the liberal bourgeoisie. Such government in the service of one sector of the
population is incompatible with Schmitt's conception of sovereignty resting in
70. See generally ScHMITT, PoLITICAL RoMANTICISM, supra note 35.
71. According to Schmitt, faced with the question,. "Christ or Barrabas?'' liberals would set up
a committee of inquiry~ SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, supra note 22~ at 78.
72. ScHMIIT, CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28.
73. Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 24.
74. SCHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35.
75. See Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy [hereinafter
Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox], in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMrrr, supra note 1, at 38, 40 ("The
liberal conception of equality postulates that every person is, as a person, automatically equal to
every other person. The democratic conception, however; requires the possibility of distinguishing
who belongs to the demos and who is exterior to it ....").
76. ScHMITT, CRISis, supra note 35, at 9.
77. /d. at 11.
78. Id. at 16.
79. See Reinhard Mehring, Liberalism as a uMetaphysical System": The Methodological
Structure of Carl Schmitt's Critique of Political Rationalism, in LAw AS POLITICS, supra note l, at
131, 132 ("What interested Schmitt was th~s not the liberal world view as such ... but the political
idea of liberalism as it emerged through its actual institutionalization.").
80. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 41-42 (summarizing Schmitt's criticisms of
functioning parliamentarism).
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the will of the people. Schmitt could tolerate no impediments to the exercise
of sovereignty in accordance with the popular will, not even constitutional principles~ The purpose of the political in Schmitt's system is the protection of the
particular existence and identity of the nation. To the extent that formal legal
rules prevent the state from embodying the will of the people, constitutionalism
82
undennines the exercise of democratic authority.
Schmitt developed his legal and political ideas in response to the crisis in
Weimar constitutionalism. As elections yielded no consensus on a desirable
for1n of government, paramilitary organizations affiliated with various political
parties took to the streets~ Political violence rose, and faith in the rule of law
declined. Schmitt despaired of the ability of legal positivism to provide a foundation for a stable system of law. He theorized that the proper basis for such
stability was in national homogeneity and in a leap of faith. The state, embodying the popular will, must be empowered to act on that will in emergency situations, even if such action contradicts the established rule of law.

C.

The Rediscovery of Schmitt by the Academic Left

Before he joined the Nazi Party, and even for a time thereafter, Schmitt was
widely read and often cited with approval by political theorists from across the
83
political spectrum. Schmitt's reputation revived, first in Germany, and then in
the United States, as political theorists on the left searched for new perspectives
from which to attack the dominant liberal paradigm in a world in which Marxist
critique seemed increasingly beside the point. Although Schmitt's name was
already familiar to some American academics, the current American interest in
Carl Schmitt really took off after the (then) leftist-oriented political journal,
Telos, published an exchange between Ellen Kennedy and scholars with expertise in the Frankfurt School. Kennedy emphasized the extent of Schmitt's importance to heroes of the academic left such as Walter Benjamin and Jiirgen
84
Habermas. The interest of Schmitt's contemporaries on the left in his theories
provieds the grounds for the current interest in Schmitt's work.
Schmitt's leftist contemporaries, including representatives of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School, took Schmitt very seriously and attempted to make use of
his criticisms of liberalism, although they were certainly aware of Schmitt's po85
litical orientation. However, in assessing Schmitt's influence on leftist thinkers, we should keep in mind that the Weimar Republic produced some of this
century's most eclectic thinkers, thinkers who could not help but be influenced
81.

Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 27.
82. ld. at 28.
83. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2 (noting citations with approval of Schmitt by
Carl Friedrich and by numerous members of the Marxian Frankfurt School); Strong, supra note 19,
at x-xii (same).
84. See Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 42-45, 56-64.
85. Ellen Kennedy shows not only that Frankfurt School members Franz Neumann, Otto
Kirchheimer, and Walter Benjamin acknowledged their indebtedness to Schmitt's political theories
but also that, at least in Benjamin's case, later editors attempted to destroy the evidence of this
influence. /d. at 44.
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by the politics of the times, in which radical leftists and the anti-democratic
forces on the right borrowed tactics and rhetoric in their separate attacks on the
forces of liberal parliamentarism. Walter Benjamin's works reflect numerous
influences ranging from Theodor Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's critical theory, to Bertolt Brecht's more straightforward materialism, to Gershom
86
Scholem's version of Jewish mysticism. It is not surprising- and not necessa~
rily very significant - that Schmitt's works informed Benjamin's analysis of
17th-century sovereignty in his first book, The Origins of German Tragic
87
Drama.
Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann incorporated Schmitt's theory of
politics into more central aspects of their own political theories, but they adapted
Schmitt in ways that clearly served their radical materialist politics. Neumann
accepted Schmitt's concept of the political as involving the recognition of
friends and enemies. For Neumann, however, the "fundamental contradiction in
Germany today is the economic contradiction, . ~ . that of labor and property
88
• . . ~"
Otto Kirchheimer replaced Schmitt's idealist notion of homogeneity
with his own materialist version, calling for social and economic homogeneity in
89
However, repreorder to eliminate sources of conflicts within a democracy.
sentatives of the Frankfurt School stopped offering positive ·assessments of
Schmitt's work after the Nazi seizure of power, when the dangers of Schmitt's
theories became clear and ·the chances of their successful incorporation into left90
ist theory accordingly diminished.
86. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Introduction, in WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS (1968)
(providing both a sympathetic account of Benjamin'-s work and a discussion of the numerous influences on his thought). Benjamin's tour-de-force essay on ''The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproduction:" takes as its central theme the need to respond to the fascist aestheticization of
politics by politicizing aesthetics. Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner techischen
Reproduzierbarkeit, in 2 WALTER BENJAMIN_, WERKAUSGABE 736 (1980).
87. WALTER BENJAMIN, URSPRUNG DES DEUTSCHEN TRAUERSPIELS ( 1928). See Kennedy, Carl
Schmitt, supra note 2, at 43-44 (pointing out Benjamin's use of Schmitt). Kennedy's evidence of
Schmitt's influence on Benjamin is not overwhelming. Both were influenced by George Sorel's
Reflections on Violence, id. at 43, but that does not mean that Benjamin followed Schmitt. Benjamin
sent Schmitt a sycophantic letter, announcing. the publication of his Origins of Getman Tragic
Drama. This act tells us more about academic politics more than it does about Schmitt's influence.
In any case, Schmitt appears to have been unimpressed with Benjamin's appropriation of his theories. /d. at 44 and n. 22.
88. /d. at 47 (citing Neumann's letter to Schmitt of Sept. 2, 1932, in REFoRM UND REsiGNATION: GESPRACHE irnER FRANZ L. NEUMANN 79 (Rainer Erd ed., 1985)).
89. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 48. Kennedy acknowledges that, after von
Papen' s coup in 1932, Kirchheimer concluded that parliamentary democracy was the only form of
•
government that could function in a time of social and national heterogeneity. /d. at 53.
90. See, e.g., id. at 54 (noting Herbert Marcuse's denunciation .of Schmitt's anti-liberalism and
the shift in the Frankfurt School's focus towards a critique of fascism). Although Gennan political
theorists approached Schmitt critically after his collaboration with the Nazis, they did not neglect
him entirely. See generally DIRK VAN LAAK, GESPRACHE IN DER SiclffiRHErr DES ScHWEIG:E~s:
CARL SCHMITT IN DER POLffiSCH:EN GEISTESGESCHICHTE DER FRUHEN BUNDESREPUBLIK (1993) (discussing the influence of Schmitt's legal and political theory on the founders of Germany's post-war
constitutional democracy). Kennedy and Ulmen make much of Haberrnas' frequent acknowledgment of Schmitt's importance. See e.g., Ulmen, supra note-2, at 1127 (sharing Habermas' assessment of Schmitt as a legitimate pupil of Weber); Kennedy,. Carl Schmitt, supra note 2, at 56-64
(arguing that Schmitt's influence on Habermas' early work is especially strong). But it should be
obvious that Habern1as' communicative action theory represents precisely the brand of liberalism
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It is easy to see why leftists committed to class struggle would be attracted
to Schmitt's politics of antagonism. It is harder to explain Schmitt's appeal to a
generation of scholars who fight their battles in lecture halls and academic jour91
nals rather than at the barricades and in the streets. Moreover, in their enthusiasm for Schmitt's theories, Schmitt's promoters engage in a certain degree of
willful blindness to his faults. In Mouffe's collection, Paul Hirst explains
Schmitt's three-year collaboration with Nazism as motivated by his preference
for order over chaos. "[P]olitical thought should not be evaluated on the basis of
an author's personal political judgements. Thus the value of Schmitt's work is
92
not diminished by the choices he made. '' Hirst's statement is both conclusory
93
and wrong.
Schmitt's biography does not require that the left refuse to investigate the possibility of using Schmitt's theories to attack an ossified version of
94
liberal dernocracy, but the value of Schmitt's work is defined by the political
choices he made, especially since he always justified his personal political deci95
sions in tern1s of his own theory.
The revival of interest in Schmitt among scholars today, many of whom are
influenced by both post-modern and Marxist theory, indicates a search for new
ways to chalJenge the liberal political model whose dominance over political
96
theory has never been more secure.
For Ellen Kennedy, the first question is
that Schmitt abhors, and Habennas' comments on Schmitt have been largely critical. He denounced
the renewed American interest in Schmitt as evidence of a new conservatism. JDRGEN HABERMAS,
Die Schrecken der Autonomie: Carl Schmitt auf Englisch, in HABERMAS, EINE ART ScHADENSABWICKLUNG 103 ( 1987).
91. It is thus not surprising that Schmitt's theories never held an attraction for the most traditionally academic representatives of the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
See Jay, supra note 2, at 73-74 (discussing Adorno's rejection of Schmitt as "undialectical").
92. Hirst, Schmitt ·s Decisionism, supra note 19, at 8.
93. Enst-Wolfgang Bockenforde adopts a more understandable position that one can focus ,on
the ~'work" rather than the "person." Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, The Concept -o f the Political: A
Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in LAw AS POLITICS, supra note I, at
37. However, the editor of that volume points out that it is not so easy to separate· the person from
the work in the case of Carl Schmitt. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at 3.
94. See Maus, supra note 22, at 200 (warning against trying to explain all of Schmitt's work in
terms of his changing political viewpoints).
95. Oren Gross provides a fine corrective to Hirst in a "personal noten that he appends to his
discussion of Schmitt:
There are ti'mes when academics do not enjoy the privilege of not taking sides and not
expressing positions. And when they do, thelr words and actions matter and they
stand accountable for them. Carl Schmitt expressed his positions clearly and acted
upon them. All those who continue to debate· his legacy must remember at all times
that this is not some exercise conducted in the ivory towers of academia with which
we are involved. It is a matter of life, and even more so, of death. "[T]heoretical
discussions never take place in a vacuum and there can be no philosophical thought
without political consequences."
Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm·Exception" Dichotomy, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825, 1867-68 (2000) (quoting ZEEV
STERNHELL eta/., THE BIRTH OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY: FROM CULTURAL REBELLION TO POLITICAL
REVOLUTION 250 ( 1994)).
96. See Hirst, Carl Schmitt's Decisionism, supra note 19, at 7 ("Political argument has been
virtually reduced to contests within liberal-democratic theory.").
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whether the left can make positive use of Schmitt's critique of liberalism.
However, implicit in the invocation of Schmitt's concept of the political is a
critique not only of contemporary liberalism, but of contemporary critical theory. Thus in introducing a special issue of Telos devoted to Schmitt, the editors
98
attack the "lame socialism of Suarez, Mitterand, and Craxi," and the "obsessive left-liberal pursuit of egalitarianism as a super-legal norm [with] debilitat99
ing consequences both in theory and in practice." To the extent that critical
theory is unable to "articulate a meaningful political theory," the Telos editors
100
argue, it has been "stymied by precisely those issues raised by Schmitt."
However, the scholars who seek to use Schmitt today are no longer committed to class struggle as the engine of social transformation. They therefore
cannot reproduce the materialist surgery that Kirchheimer and Neumann performed. Indeed, while the Frankfurt School sought to use Schmitt's critique of
liberalism to smash liberalism, Mouffe seeks to use Schmitt to foster liberal selfcritique.101 The essays on Schmitt that appeared in Telos used his work to high102
Mouffe finds Schmitt especially useful in
light weaknesses in critical theory.
problematizing the pluralistic view of democratic citizenship: he challenges liberals to formulate the "commonality" that underlies a political community in
103
While
such a way as to preserve religious, moral and cultural pluralism.
Scheuerman's work indicates ways in which Schmitt's theories can contribute to
a leftist critique of liberal jurisprudence, and Law as Politics indicates Schmitt's
historical significance as well as his lingering influence on Gennan law and
politics, The Challenge of Carl Schmitt demonstrates that political theorists have
yet to articulate the ways in which Schmitt's attacks on liberalism can contribute
to a revival of radical politics, or even foster liberal self-critique in ways that
liberalism cannot on its own.
II.
INSERTING CARL SCHMITT INTO THE AMERICAN DISCU SSION OF
PoLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY

The three books under review here present three very different views on the
question of Schmitt's relevance to contemporary theory. Mouffe's authors approach Schmitt, in Mouffe' s words, as "one of the great political and legal theo97. Kennedy, Rejoinder, supra note 2, at 102. Kennedy believes that the question should be
answered in the affinnative, as there is no other way to explain the attraction of Schmitt's theories to
"some of this centuryt s most influential leftist theorists ...." /d.
98~ Piccone and Ulmen, supra note 1, at 4.
99. /d. at 5.
100. /d. at 3. TELos' role as the chief disseminator of Schmitt's ideas to an English-language
audience, together with its attacks on both liberalism and critical theory, has led many of its readers
to conclude that the turn to Schmitt reflects the editors' decision to transform TELOS into a neoconservative journal.
101. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 38, 52, n.2.
102. Kennedy, Carl Schmitt, supra note 2; Kennedy, Rejoinder, supra note 2; Ulmen and Piccone, supra note 1.
103. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 50.
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104

rists of this century."
Many of the essays do not directly discuss Schmitt's
ideas or his influence but simply treat him in relation to other leading political
theorists. The authors collected in Dyzenhaus' collection offer a narrower assessment of Schmitt's relevance to contemporary political and legal theory.
However, as Dyzenhaus writes in summary of the essays he has edited, the writers tend to fault Schmitt, especially for "the paucity of his own positive
105
thought."
Scheuerman offers the most focused assessment, inserting
Schmitt's analysis of the problem of underdetermination into the North American debate regarding underdetern1ination and its consequences.
Because the authors in Mouffe's collection generally accept that Schmitt's
importance has been established, they do not discuss why it is important to read
him today. Four essays that create a central section of this compilation treat
Schmitt in relation to other thinkers. Jorge Dotti' s essay is an explication of
106
Marx as read by Schmitt.
Grigoris Ananiadis' contribution explains the attraction Carl Schmitt had for the Austro-Marxist, Max Adler, one of the first to
107
Catheuse Schmitt in order to criticize the political mainstream from the left.
108
These esrine Colliot-Thelene's essay compares Schmitt with Max Weber.
says are solid pieces of the traditional variety of intellectual history that assesses
the impact of one body of work on another. However, readers who are not
already convinced of Schmitt's contemporary significance might wonder why
109
Only
they should care how the fascist Schmitt interpreted Marx and Weber.
David Dyzenhaus' essay in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, which focuses not on
Schmitt but on John Rawls and Hermann Heller, assesses Schmitt's significance
110
Dyzenhaus concludes that, while there is some value in
as a political theorist.
Schmitt's diagnosis of the ills of the modern parliamentary system, his solutions
must be rejected. As a result, Dyzenhaus recommends that we focus our atten111
tion on Schmitt's contemporary, the social democrat, Hermann Heller.
Ulrich PreuB also seems to think that the focus on Schmitt is inappropriate.
Surveying the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe, he concludes that Schmitt's
"significance is clearly bound to a particular historical epoch which is about to
11 2
vanish."
l 04.

Mouffe, Introduction, supra note 1, at 1.
105. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note 1, at 17.
I 06. Jorge E. Dotti, From Karl to Carl: Schmitt as a Reader of Marx, in CHALLENGE OF CARL
ScHMITT, supra note 1, at 92.
107. Ananiadis, supra note 52, at 118.
108. Catherine Colliot-Thelene, Carl Schmitt versus Max Weber: Juridical Rationality and Economic Rationality, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMrrr, supra note 1, at 138.
109. All of these essays are significant pieces of scholarship. As they do not address the theme
of this review essay, however, I will not discuss them at length. Dotti and Colliot-Thelene do not
address the question of Schmitt's significance to contemporary theory. Ananiadis' comparison of
Schmitt and Adler is intended to "caution [readers] regarding the possible uses of Schmitt."
Ananiadis, supra note 52, at 118.
110. David Dyzenhaus, Putting the State Back in Credit, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMnT,
supra note 1, at 75.
Ill. /d. at 85-89.
112. PreuB, supra note 64, at 178.
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In the introduction to Law as Politics,-Dyzenhaus explains the recent interest in Schmitt in the United States in terms of an attempt by North American
s.c holars to understand the traditional German academic field of study, Staatslehre, a discipline that analyzes the development of states bound by the rule of
113
law. · · Dyzenhaus nonetheless finds it "perplexing" and "disturbing'' that
Schmitt is the practitioner of Staatslehre whose writings have received the most
114
attention.
Still, the choice of Schmitt is not without its justifications. To the
extent that contemporary liberal theory builds on John Rawls' works on political
115
theory,
liberal theory endeavors to establish overlapping values on which ~11
members of society can agree regardless of their individual conceptions of the
116
good life.
Schmitt rejected the notion that values could be established in the
abstract. Rather, values express the essence of a specific community. Schmitt
thus makes possible an attack on Rawlsian liberalism that begins by questioning
its basic assumptions.
Scheuennan begins helpfully by pointing out the basic ingredients of the
liberal conception of the rule of law. "According to the mainstream of modern
liberal theory, the rule of law at a minimum requires that legal nonns be ( 1)
general in character, (2) relatively clear, (3) public, (4) prospective, and (5) stable." 117 Liberal theory struggles to· reconcile these principles with the increasing realization that necessary forms of state economic intervention inevitably
result in the exercise of discretionary powers by judges and administrators. 118
Consequently, the law is underdetertnined, and contemporary legal theorists debate both the extent and the consequences of this underdetermination. The most
common response to the challenge of legal underdeterrninacy is the fonnalist
approach, which recognizes that certain "hard cases" will be decided in the interstices between formal rules but is satisfied that legal rules can ,g uide administrators in the vast majority of cases. 119 More troubled by the underdeterminacy
of legal rules, legal realists argue that legal rules provide inadequate guides to
political decision-makers. 120
According to Scheuennan, thinkers as diverse as Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin reach the same conclusion as the legal realists, but they look to
external sources of objectivity and unifortnity in order to regularize legal decision-making processes. For Posner, the laws of economics guide legal reasoning; for Dworkin, judges apply the law coherently when they interpret the law to
accord with the political morality of the community.121 Critical legal theorists
are so suspicious. of the discretion exercised by the government that they find
113. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note I, at I.
114. !d. at 1. Dyzenhaus touts Hennann Heller as the Weimar legal theorist whose. positive
program might provide more clues about the solutions to the kinds of problems facing liberal theorists today. /d. at 17, 19, n.38.
115. JOHN RAwLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971).
116. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, supra note 1, at 15.
117. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 4.
118. /d. at 5.
119. I d. at 6.
120. /d. at 6-7.
121. ld. at 7.
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122
legal indeterminacy to be the inescapable rule.
For legal theorists wrestling
with the problem of underdetennination, Scheuerman argues, Schmitt provides
both a useful analysis of the problem and an object lesson in the dangers that can
arise when one concludes that liberalism cannot provide a mechanism for avoiding arbitrary uses of legal authority.
A.

1.

Schmitt and Political Theory

Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism and Contemporary Political Theory

One virtue of The Challenge of Carl Schmitt is that it includes a number of
contributions by scholars whose writings on Carl Schmitt have not, to my
knowledge, been hitherto available in English. Jean-Franc;ois Kervegan, an expert on Hegelian philosophy and the importance of Hegel's work to an understanding of Schmitt, provides a synoptic overview of Schmitt's corpus, focusing
123
on his post-war "geopolitical" writings.
Kervegan's work is informative, focusing on themes to which North American scholarship has been largely inattentive. To the extent that Kervegan explicates texts that are not widely available
in English, his essay will prove valuable to political theorists interested in
Schmitt but unable to read him in the original. Although Kervegan finds
Schmitt's critique of globalization and imperialism illuminating, however, he
does not present Schmitt's analysis as either a model or a challenge for left-wing
politics. Consequently, his . essay does not really advance the discussion of
Schmitt's relevance to contemporary critical theory, as the collection's title and
124
Mouffe' s introduction suggested.
Unfortunately, the remaining essays in Mouffe's compilation also do not
illuminate the challenge of Carl Schmitt - or why we should regard him as an
especially useful critic of contemporary liberal theory. Mouffe's own contribution comes closest. Mouffe finds compelling Schmitt's illumination of the ten125
sion between democracy and liberalism.
Schmitt illuminates this tension by
stressing the demos at the heart of democracy. Based in the people, democracy
requires both homogeneity, and, "if the need arises," the eradication of heterogeneity.126 Mouffe wants to use Schmitt in order to develop a more realistic approach to a pluralistic view of democratic citizenship. In her view, liberals have
chosen simply to disregard the problem of how a pluralistic society decides on
127
principles of inclusion and exclusion.
Mouffe cautions liberals to heed
Schmitt's warnings regarding the need to have a substantive basis for the demos.
She fears that liberals tend to favor globalized citizenship and that, stripped of
122. /d. at 7-8.
123. See Kervegan, supra note 22.
124. The grounds for Mouffe's decision to include in this collection re-prints of Hirst's 12-year
old essay and PreuB' seven-year old essay are mysterious.
125. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 38.
126. ScHMrrT, Preface to the Second Edition, in ScHMITT, CRISIS, supra note 35, at 9.
127. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 50-51.
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In short,
their roots in a demos, liberals will lose their democratic rights.
129
She accepts Schmitt's
Mouffe thinks that liberalism requires the nation-state.
insights regarding the tension between liberal and democratic conceptions of
equality, but argues that "[t]he democratic logic .of constituting the people, and
inscribing rights and equality into practices, is necessary to subvert the tendency
130
Mouffe argues
towards abstract universalism inherent in liberal discourse."
that Schmitt has not found the fatal flaw in liberal theory. Rather, she treats
Schmitt as having discovered a productive tension at the heart of liberalism.
The tension is not easily resolved, but "[l]iberal-democratic politics consists, in
fact, in the constant process of negotiation and renegotiation - through different
131
hegemonic articulations - of this constitutive paradox."
It is undeniable that liberal theory has struggled to establish the framework
within which the liberal doctrine of equality applies. But .c ontemporary liberal
theory ably addresses the difficulty of reconciling liberal nationalism with liberal cosmopolitanism. 132 Mouffe posits that democracy is endangered because
of modem liberalism's "incapacity to conceptualize" a frontier between "us" and
133
"them,"
but this need not be the proje.c t of liberalism or of any political ideology. Mouffe argues that liberalism needs to confront Schmitt's call for homogeneity. She simply states: ''[Schmitt] is right to say that a political democracy
cannot be based on the distinctionlessness of all mankind, and that it must be
134
rooted in a specific people."
The resurgence of 19th_century nationalisms in
1
the late 20 h-century provides us with ample evidence that a far more promising
project is that of eradicating irrelevant or mythical distinctions among people
135
who can be united in the service of common political goals.
128. Mouffe begins her contribution to The Challenge of Carl Schmitt by criticizing the advocates, such as David Held and Richard Falk, of "cosmopolitan citizenship." Mouffe, Schmitt and the
Paradox, supra note 75, at 39.
129. /d. at 41-42.
130. ld. at 43.
131. /d. at 44.
132. For example, compare the very interesting writings of Will Kymlicka, who struggles to
reconcile liberal and national goals, WILL KYMLICKA, STATES, NATIONs AND CuLTURES (1997) (arguing that tensions rarely arise between individual rights and group rights); WILL KYMLICKA, MuLTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (attempting
to reconcile
.
a theory of minority group rights with ·the liberal focus on individual rights) with Kwame Anthony
Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRmCAL INQUIRY 617 (1997) (attempting to reconcile cosmopolitanism with nationalist patriotism)~
133. Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 43.
134. Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy, in LAw AS PoLITIcs, supra note 1, at 159, 161. This is the same essay that appears in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL
ScHMI:rr, but Mouffe tempered the language when she re-printed her essay. In the re-printed version, the line reads, "(Schmitt] is right to say that a political democracy cannot be based on the
generality of all mankind, and that it must belong to a specific people.'' Mouffe, Schmitt and the
Paradox, supra note 75, at 40. Mouffe must have noticed that her invocation of "rootless" cosmopolitanism brought her political theory uncomfortably close to that of volkisch nationalism.
135. Jiirgen Habennas has promoted the idea of constitutional patriotism to supplant more traditional fonns of national identification. In the light .o f the on-going integration of the western European states into the European Union, there is reason to think that Haberrnas' idea is no mere
pipedream. See, e.g., JDRGEN HABERMAS, A BERLIN REPuBLic: WRITINGS ON GERMANY (Steven
Rendall trans., 1997) (including a number of essays on Gennan unification and the specter of a
renewal of German nationalism). In contrast to Mouffe; John McCormick argues that we need to be
'
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Given that even some of the authors she collects reject Schmitt as a theore136
Mouffe's introduction is inteltician from whose insights the left can profit,
lectually bullying. Mouffe treats as a foregone conclusion Schmitt's importance
137
For Mouffe, if not for the authors she has assembled, it is
to her readership.
clear that Schmitt is to be read and is to be read for one purpose - in order to
138
"bring the crucial deficiencies of the dominant liberal approach to the fore."
In his contribution to Mouffe's collection, Ulrich PreuB insists that Schmitt's
139
work "still has some significance for us."
Unlike Mouffe, however, PreuB
supports his argument for Schmitt's significance with an analysis of post-war
Germany's constitutional system in which he highlights that system's indebted140
PreuB' essay also demonstrates
ness to elements of Schmitt's thought.
141
Schmitt's peculiar relevance to discussions of German constitutional theory.
He makes no attempt to argue for Schmitt's broader relevance to the problems
posed by political liberalism .
...,
Slovej Zizek's essay epitomizes the main problem with The Challenge of
Carl Schmitt: its authors tend to use the occasion of a collection of essays purportedly on Carl Schmitt to write on other topics. Zizek' s begins helpfully
enough, informing us that Schmitt is a "modem" thinker because of "the gap
142
between the act of decision and its content."
Conservative modernism is
grounded for Zizek on a paradox in that it requires a return to unconditional
143
While
authority, but that authority cannot be grounded on positive reasons.
Zizek' s analysis is not inappropriate as a description of Schmitt's thought and its
"'
problems, it is not clear why Zizek thinks these tendencies and problems are
unique to modem thought or to conservative modernism. In any case, after this
""
brief introductory commentary on Schmitt, Zizek returns to his more familiar
familiar with Schmitt's legal theory precisely because we might be witnessing a new chapter in the
battle between liberal democratic forces and the forces of fascism or military dictatorship in Central
Europe. Liberalism needs to be on guard against Schmittian ideas because they may well inform
sophisticated new forn1s of totalitarian government. McCoRMICK, ScHMrrr' s CRmQUE, supra note
1, at 13.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
137. Mouffe's conclusory statement, "[t]hat Schmitt is one of the great political and legal theorists of this century is now widely recognized," would likely come as a surprise to the majority of
American practitioners of both political and legal theory. Mouffe~ Introduction, supra note 1, at 1.
138. /d. at 2.
139. PreuB, supra note 64, at 155.
140. /d. at 165-72.
141. Specifically, PreuB points out the residue of Schmitt's decisionism in the Gennan constitutional court's characterization of the Basic Law as making fundamental constitutional decisions reflecting the political will of its authors to privilege certain values. /d. at 165. PreuB also notes that
the German constitution, unlike those of other modem democracies, is not a constitutive document.
That is, while the U.S. constitution brings into being a political entity that could not exist without it,
the Gennan Basic Law merely preserves a pre-existing order. /d. at 168-170. PreuB provides a very
useful analysis. My only caveat is to caution that Schmitt is not the only possible source for these
elements of the Gennan Basic Law, and I do not think that PreuB intended for us to believe that
Schmitt's theories alone can account for the major differences between Gennan and U.S.
constitutionalism.
"'
142. Slavoj Zizek,
Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, in CHALLENGE OF CARL ScHMnT,
supra note 1, at 18, 20.
143. /d.
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themes- Derrida's and Lacan's analyses of religion and theater- and the first
stream-of-consciousness burst of his essay culminates in the singularly unedify144
ing insight that Antigone is a bad model for anti-fascist resistance.
Zizek suggests that reference to Carl Schmitt is "crucial in detecting the
145
deadlocks of post-political liberal tolerance."
Schmitt would have us re-in.....
sert real political antagonisms into our political systems. Zizek approves of this
gesture but also seeks to control it by equating the universal with the "militant,
146
divisive position of one engaged in a struggle."
Zizek' s universalism does
not entail universal tolerance but the "passionate struggle for the assertion of the
Truth which compels ... " that struggle. 147 While Schmitt's position is conservative, Zizek insists that his own is radical. Be that as it may, in Zizek's
essay, the problems posed by Schmitt serve as little more than a point of departure for a discussion of the theories of Freud, Lacan, and Derrida. Although
Zizek returns to Schmitt periodically in the remainder of his essay, he does so in
order to remind his readers, since they have probably forgotten, that the topic at
hand is Carl Schmitt. Ultimately, Zizek does not really write about Schmitt at
all. He uses the space allotted to him to further develop his own philosophical
system. Zizek' s system is a world unto itself, and this is not the place in which
.....
to assess it. In any case, Zizek' s contribution does little to illuminate the
thought of Carl Schmitt. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the purpose of
.....
including an essay by Zizek in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt was not to improve our appreciation of Schmitt but to move merchandise by capitalizing on
the current popularity of Zizek' s brand of theorizing.
.....

v

v

v

The Challenge of Carl Schmitt thus fails to clarify why Schmitt's critique
of liberalism should be of especial interest to us today. In her earlier collaboration with Ernesto LaClau, Mouffe embraced a Gramscian model of politics that
synthesized theory and real political developments into a stimulating alternative·
148
to liberalism.
No longer interested in pursuing a Gramscian approach,
Mouffe looks to a right-wing thinker to provide a perspective on liberalism that
she could easily have found, in her pre-post-Marxist days, in the writings of leftwing thinkers. Nowhere is this more obvious than in her critique of Habertnasian deliberative democracy, in which she faults communicative action theory
149
for replacing an economic model of politics with a moral one.
While Mouffe
previously wrote as a radical critic of liberalism, she now seeks to use Schmitt's
diagnosis in order to cure liberalism. But Schmitt's critique, to the extent that it
is not based on a distorted perspective on liberalism, tells liberals only about
weaknesses that they could have discovered without Schmitt's aid.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

/d. at 20-21.
ld. at 35.
/d.

/d.
ERNESTO LACLAU

and

CHANTAL MouFFE, HEGEMONY AND SociALIST STRATEGY

Mouffe, Schmitt and the Paradox, supra note 75, at 44-46.

(1995).
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The Flaws and Limitations of Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism

Schmitt criticizes parliamentarism on the ground that actual parliaments do
not exemplify the values of liberalism. He despairs of parliamentary government because the parliaments he has studied do not engage in the sort of informed, disinterested, unconstrained political debate that is, according to liberal
theory, to result in reasoned governance and the rule of law. Schmitt thus despairs of the possibility of the rule of law based on such "empty formalism.'' 150
However, Scheuerman points out that liberalism thrives despite the limitations
of working parliaments because liberal society gives rise to a public sphere in
151
which the values. .of free exchange and debate can be realized.
Schmitt's
critique of liberalism is not irrelevant; parliamentary government would be improved if parliamentary deliberation were more respectful of the principles of
liberalism. However, the technical imperfections in the functioning of liberal
democracy do not undermine the aims of liberal parliamentarism. Schmitt underestimates both the resiliency of the parliamentary system and the power of
the extra-parliamentary public sphere to hold in check the illiberal excesses of
parliament.
Several of the essays collected in Law as Politics provide helpful characterizations as well as commentaries on Schmitt's critique of liberalism. What differentiates these commentaries from those of many of the authors collected in
The Challenge of Carl Schmitt is the historical specificity with which they approach the question of Schmitt's significance. The essays in Law as Politics
treat Schmitt as a thinker confronting the legal and political issues of his day.
They stress both the brilliance of Schmitt's analysis and the limited applicability
of his approach.
According to Heiner Bielefeldt, Schmitt's critique of liberalism can be divided into two contradictory parts. First, liberals cannot simultaneously adopt
the nortnative principle of neutrality and embrace the rule of law and constitutional de.mocracy. Second, liberals are hypocrites because they hide behind their
152
universal principles in order to promote their own economic goals.
Schmitt
criticizes liberals for having no values and for promoting the values associated
with their economic interests. But Bielefeldt points out that liberal theory distinguishes between neutrality as to norms (Wertneutralitiit) and neutrality as to
world~vie.ws (Weltanschauungsneutralitiit). The state is not permitted to discriminate among people on the basis of their world-views - that is, on the basis
153
of their particular religious or non-religious convictions.
Thus while liberalism preserves the normative idea of ''respect for the dignity of every human
being as a morally autonomous subject," 154 liberalism, at least in the Kantian
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

ScHEUERMAN,

supra note 8, at 60.

/d. at 57.
Bielefeldt, supra note 59, at 24.
/d. at 29.
/d. at 30.
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variant that Bielefeldt defends, does not embrace Wertneutralitiit because the
155
morally autonomous individual is still subject to the categorical imperative.
As to liberal hypocrisy, as Scheuennan repeatedly points out, Schmitt relies
1
on an idealized version of 19 h century liberalism in order to contrast modernity
with 19th-century models and to demonstrate the inadequacy of those models for
the purposes of modem governance. Schmitt posits that state intervention in
technological and economic fields represents a new encroachment by the state
into the private sphere. But no state was ever neutral with regard to economic
developments in the way liberal theory conceived that it ought to be. Central
European economies in the 19th century were driven by state interventions, and,
while the welfare state was not yet fully developed, the provision of basic social
156
welfare was already a well-established function of the state.
Dominique Leydet provides a slightly different characterization of
Schmitt's critique of liberal parliamentarism, dividing it into a refutation of the
liberal conception of politics and a demonstration of the obsolescence of parlia157
mentarism in the face of the development of mass democracy.
While Leydet
recognizes that Schmitt wrote with the various crises of the Weimar Republic in
mind, she treats his critique of pluralism as a more generalized response to "the
158
transfonnation of the nineteenth-century state toward the 'total state.'"
Schmitt believed that the problems of pluralism could be resolved only by either
recognizing the superior authority of the state over pluralistic associations or by
subordinating the state to those organizations and thus leaving political outcomes to be detennined by the compromises among opposing interests. Leydet
points to a possibility that Schmitt did not consider: that the process of recon159
ciling diverse interests is the foundry in which the common will is forged.
Schmitt did not consider this possibility because of two assumptions in his
analysis of pluralism. First, Schmitt assumes that political parties are simply the
160
Second, Schmitt assumes that parliament
mouthpieces of sectional interests.
only seeks to mediate among divergent interests through rational public discus161
For Leydet, Schmitt's first assumption is inaccurate as an empirical
sion.
matter. Parliamentary governments differ from corporatist bodies precisely because political parties act with a certain degree of autonomy from the economic
162
interest that they seek, in part, to represent.
Leydet counters Schmitt's second assumption with reference to Kelsen,
163
Citwhose analysis of the workings of parliamentary democracy she prefers.
•

155.
156.
157.

/d.

supra note 8, at I 09-110.
.
Dominique Leydet, Pluralism and the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, in LAw
PoLITICS, supra note I, at I 09.
158. /d. at 110.
ScHEUERMAN,

AS

159. /d.
160. /d. at 118.
161. /d. at 119.
162. /d. at 118-19. Schmitt's analysis of the problems of parliamentary governments does not
work well with respect to the major political parties of the United States. These parties do not
purport to represent particular sectoral interests, but seek to represent the same sectoral interests.
163. /d. at 119-20.
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164

Leydet notes that majority parties cannot simply ignore the interests of minority parties and still expect
165
Thus, even if
the minority parties to participate in the parliamentary game.
there were a perfect overlap between political parties and economic interests,
that overlap would not produce the results that Schmitt predicted. Parliamentary
government survives because it provides many means through which different
social groups can air their views, confront their political opponents, and promote
the implementation of policies that serve their interests. Schmitt argues that
because political liberalism does not promote rational decision-making, it must
devolve into an irrational struggle among competing interests. Leydet finds a
logic in modem parliamentarism and concludes that the rationality of discussion
is preserved because "parliamentary debates serve as a public test for policies"
and because policies still must be "justified on the basis of certain shared princi166
ples."
Leydet, following Habermas, also points out that, while Schmitt assumes that parliaments can only function through rational deliberation, modem
parliaments communicate with both their political opponents and their constituencies through various techniques, of which rational deliberation is merely one
167
example.
In his very focused commentary on the development of Schmitt's idea of
dictatorship, John McCormick proposes that Schmitt came to accept the need for
168
a pennanent dictatorship in response to the threat of communism.
In his
1921 book on dictatorship, Schmitt had traced the idea of dictatorship back to its
Roman origins and advocated temporary dictatorship as an efficient response to
169
Schmitt called this form of dictatorship
a temporary state of emergency.
170
"commissariaL''
Schmitt criticized liberals for treating all dictatorship as permanent - that is, as synonymous with Caesarism - and he admired the Bolsheviks for their understanding of dictatorship as a temporary stage on the road
171
In his work of the following year, Politische Theologie,
to communism.
Schmitt embraced the notion of the dictator as a sovereign, capable of embody172
This same concept of sovereignty embodied in a
ing the will of the people.
173
Indictator, infortned Schmitt's writings throughout the Weimar Republic.
creasingly, as the crisis of the Weimar Republic deepened, Schmitt muddied the
distinctions he had made between normal and extraordinary constitutional oper.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168_.
169.
170.

HANs KELSEN, VoM

WESEN uNo WERT DER DEMOKRATIE

(1929).

Leydet, supra note 151, at 119.
Id. at 126.
/d. at 120-23.
McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 234.
ScHMITI, DIE DIKTATUR, supra note 22.
McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 218-22.
171. Id. at 220.
172. ScHMITT, PoLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, supra note 22; McCorn1ick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship,
supra note 22, at 226; 229.
173. McCorn1ick specifically discusses the role of dictatorship in CARL ScHMrrr, VERFASSUNGSL.E HRE (1928); CARL ScHMnT, DER HOTER DER VERFASSUNG (1931), CARL ScHMn"I", LEGALITAT
UND LEGITIMITAT (1932). McConnick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 230. In the
context of the Weimar constitutional scheme, the role of dictator fell to the President, in this case,
the increasingly senile General Paul von Hindenburg.
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174

The state of emergency came to define the essence of sovereignty for
ations.
Schmitt.
McConnick concludes that three lessons can be drawn from Schmitt's theory of dictatorship: (1) liberal constitutional theory has been inadequately attentive to the problem of exceptional situations; (2) the notion of sovereignty ought
to be uncoupled from constitutional provisions for emergency powers; and (3)
there ought to be a constitutional distinction between who determines that a state
of emergency exists and who is empowered to act in such emergency situa175
These are indeed problems that liberal theory ought to confront. In the
tions.
United States, for example, courts often invoke the "political question" doctrine
and thus avoid addressing questions of judicial limitations on the exercise of
176
executive powers in crisis situations.
Ultimately, however, McCormick rejects Schmitt's reduction of the question of sovereignty to the exceptional situation. The exception reveals, according to McConnick, only that classical
liberalism was naive about constitutional emergencies. If emergency powers
177
endure, the constitution will not.
Jeffrey Seitzer, in his contribution to Law as Politics, joins Scheuennan,
Dyzenhaus, McCormick and other political theorists who encourage us to read
178
Seitzer argues that
Schmitt in order to avoid repeating his mistakes.
Schmitt's approach to legal theory is primarily concerned with compensating for
179
and he recommends that we
the specific defects of Weimar constitutionalism,
be wary lest the new constitutions being devised for Central and Eastern Europe
180
be implemented in accordance with Schmitt's legal theory.
Seitzer' s essay
concludes Law as Politics, and it is a fitting way for the collection to end. It
summarizes the general approach taken in that volume: treating Schmitt as a
serious but dangerous thinker whose writings should not be ignored, both because they challenge liberal theorists to strengthen their defenses of their principles and because Schmitt articulates the unspoken premises of anti-democratic
constitutionalism.

B.

Schmitt in Conversation with Contemporary American Legal Theory

One of the weaknesses of Mouffe' s collection is that it repeatedly addresses
a liberal orthodoxy without specifying the contours of the liberal credo. William
Scheuertnan, by contrast, places Schmitt into a useful conversation with contemporary liberal legal theory by specifying the challenges that liberal legal theory
faces and by pointing out Schmitt's relevance to those challenges in his work,
McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 235.
/d. at 237.
For critical commentaries on the political question doctrince, see THOMAS M. FRANCK,
PoLITICAL QuESTIONs/JuoiCIAL ANsWERs: DoEs THE RuLE oF LAw APPLY TO FoREIGN AFFAIRS 8
(1992); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
177. McCormick, Dilemmas of Dictatorship, supra note 22, at 239-240.
178. Jeffrey Seitzer, Carl Schmitt's Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: Veifassungslehre as a Response to the Weimar State Crisis, in LAw AS PoLmcs, supra note 1, at 281.
179. /d. at 281.
180. Jd. at 282.
174.
175.
176.
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Carl Schmitt: The End of Law. Scheuertnan understands the attraction of
Schmitt to contemporary legal theorists based on Schmitt's attention to problems
that contemporary liberalism needs to address. But he also points out that too
many of those responsible for the recent revival of interest in Schmitt overlook
that for Schmitt the crisis of parliamentarism was part of a broader crisis of legal
181
Schmitt's political theory needs to be viewed in the context
indeterminacy.
of his legal theory.
Schmitt identified legal underdetertninacy as the Achilles heel of liberal
legal theory, and he attempted to exploit that weakness to undennine liberalism
entirely. Scheuennan acknowledges the force of Schmitt's anti-liberal critique,
but he also provides two important caveats. First, while Schmitt demonstrates
the difficulties involved in trying to resolve the problem of underdetern1inacy,
his writings only ought to have relevance for those who share his conclusion that
underdetertninacy is widespread and unavoidable. Second, Scheuennan points
out that Schmitt "consistently relied on idealized and downright misleading interpretations of classical liberal political and legal ideals as instruments for
182
Whether or not
mocking contemporary liberal democratic aspirations."
Schmitt's critique of the liberalism of his time is convincing, Scheuer1nan asserts that it certainly falls far short of doing justice to the idiosyncracies of postCold-War politics. Furthern1ore, it is difficult to see how the left can make use
of Schmitt's solution to the problem of underdetenninacy, which was to guarantee legal regularity through the promotion of homogeneity in the judiciary and
183
While grappling
acquiescence in the exceptional decisions of the sovereign.
with the problem of indeterrninacy, Schmitt abandoned hope for democratic
governance and developed a theory of dictatorship that he believed was the only
184
However, Scheuern1an reminds us
means of resolving that indetenninacy.
that Schmitt's concept of the political focuses on the crisis situation and thus
underemphasizes the everyday politics of negotiation and peaceful interchange.185 If Antigone is a bad model for anti-fascist resistance, Schmitt may
be an equally bad model for a critique of a functioning liberal democratic
government.

181. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 39.
182. /d. at 18.
183. According to Scheuertnan, this theme was recognizable even in Schmitt's earliest writings.
/d. at 24.
184. /d. at 34. Scheuer rnan agrees with John McConnick that Schmitt acknowledged the utility
only of temporary dictatorships in 1921 but fully embraced authoritarianism one year later. See
discussion supra accompanying notes 168-175.
185. S c HEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 46. In his contribution to Law as Politics, Ernst-Wolfgang
Bockenforde points out that Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction has relatively little application to
domestic politics. In any case, Schmitt's concept of the political was descriptive rather than normative. Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl
Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in LAw AS PoLITics, supra note 1, at 37, 38. However, Bockenforde acknowledges that Schmitt allowed his theory to be applied as a nonnative theory of domestic politics throughout his lifetime, and that those who seek to make use of his theories today clearly
have domestic politics in mind.
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Temporal and Theoretical Limitations of Schmitt's Critique

Schmitt's jurisprudential writings in the 1920s culminated with a book on
86
constitutional theory, Die Verfassungslehre,l in which he attempted to show
that liberal, parliamentary government is incapable of giving rise to the rule of
187
law because the parliament itself is arbitrary and unregulated.
Scheuerman
follows Leo Strauss in pointing out that Schmitt's "critique of liberalism takes
188
but Scheuerman provides further
place within the horizon of liberalism,''
specificity: the liberalism in question is that of Hans Kelsen' s legal positivism.
Schmitt'B demolition of liberal theory extends. only to liberalism as theorized by
189
Kelsen.
Classical liberalism boasted lofty normative goals, but Kelsen split
legal norms off from moral nonns, and liberalism consequently devolved into a
190
mode of "bourgeois relativism."
Schmitt's attempt to use Kelsen's theory as a metonym for the entirety of
the liberal political tradition lacks historical grounding. Schmitt presents a jurisprudentiaVphilosophical critique of liberalism, but he does not and cannot show
that liberalism has historically devolved into the sort of anti-normative system
191
that he associates with Kelsen.
Ultimately, Scheuerrnan concludes, because
Schmitt is trapped within Kelsen' s model of constitutional theory, he cannot get
beyond the principles of liberal constitutionalism. However, because Schmitt
replaces Kelsen' s pure theory of law with a pure theory of will that ultimately
gives rise to a fonn of authoritarianism legitimized through plebiscitarianism,
192
Schmitt abandons the best features of the liberal model.
In the 1930s Schmitt began to develop his critique of liberalism into a theory of the total state. Schmitt traces the tension in nineteenth-century European
governments as legislative bodies, run by career administrators, came to usurp
executive power. As the legislative state increasingly supplants the executive
state, the divide between state and society is eliminated, and the state increasingly intervenes in economic and social functions previously within the realm of
193
an autonomous civil society.
In the modern technological age, the state must
94
master economics and technology in order to retain its political power!
But
as the legislative state, subject as it is to the influence of antagonistic interest
groups, gains control over the economy and technology, the indeterminacy of its
legal decisions becomes increasingly threatening to the rule. of law. Rather than
attempting to theorize a revival of the rule of law, Schmitt chooses to discard the
195
liberal model, as "inconsistent with the structural imperatives of our times."
.

186.

CARL ScHMI'I"I', DIE VE~FASSUNGSLEJ-IRE

.

(1928) [hereinafter ScHMITr,

VERFASSUNGS-

LEHRE].

supra note 8, at 61.
t 88. Leo· Strauss, Comments on Carl Schmitt's Begriff des Politischen, reprinted in ScHMITI,
THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 83, 105.
189. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 62.
190. Id. at 64 (quoting ScHMI'I"r, VERFASSUNOSLEHRE, supra note 186, at 67).
191. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8; at 65-66.
192. /d. at 82-83'.
187.

SCHEUERMAN,

193.
194.
195.

Id. at 89...90.
Id. at 92-93.
/d. at 97.
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Schmitt finds dictatorship better suited to modernity because in that form of
government arbitrary action is taken as a given. 196
Schmitt arrived at his position through a number of steps, all of which are
subject to criticism. The first step is the position that Schmitt shares with contemporary radicals, that is the position that the law is underdetennined and that
judges and administrators are unavoidably empowered to make arbitrary decisions. Scheuennan expresses no view as to whether or not this is correct, but he
points out that while contemporary theorists accept underdeterrrtination as the
inevitable outcome of the adntinistration of laws, Schmitt treated un197
derdetertnination as a problem that could be solved.
Instead of addressing the
accuracy of Schmitt's assessment of the extent of the problem of legal underdetermination, Scheuertnan criticizes the second step, Schmitt's solution to
that problem. Seeing pluralism as the source of the failures of modem parliamentarism, Schmitt concluded that legal determinacy could be re-established
only by a caste of ethnically homogeneous ')udicial experts dedicated to an
198
equally homogeneous worldview."
For Schmitt, writing after 1933, this
meant that all laws were to be interpreted according to the intellectual spirit of
199
National Socialism.
Although Scheuertnan acknowledges Schmitt's complicity in the successful introduction of legal determinacy in Germany through the
imposition of Nazi values on the law, 200 he also points out that Schmitt was a
victim of the limitations of his theory. Ethnic homogeneity does not guarantee
legal detertninacy. His ethnic brethren ousted Schmitt from his leadership positions within the Nazi hierarchy, in part because they disagreed with his ideas
about the law. 201
Scheuerman concludes that, with respect to contemporary legal theory,
Schmitt is most useful as a case study: "[t]he case of Carl Schmitt clearly contradicts the naive assumption shared by some jurists today that 'liberating those
who wield legal power from the 'mistaken' belief that legal doctrine constrains
202
their actions will have progressive effects. '"
I agree with Scheuerman that
both legal and political theorists should derive from their study of Schmitt a
heightened awareness of the dangers of certain theoretical possibilities that leftwing legal theory has explored. Scheuertnan does not treat Schmitt's critique of
liberalism as a source that can be mined in the interests of a new approach to
political theory. Rather, he focuses on pointing out the dangers of following
Schmitt's approach to its logical conclusions. But those who advocate a return
196. /d.
197. /d. at 137-38. Scheuerrnan characterizes the position that "all cases are hard" as "problematic in its own terms" and notes that "[l]egal nihilism and liberal democracy hardly make good
bedfellows." /d. at 138.
198. ScHEUERMAN, supra note 8, at 126-27 (explicating CARL ScHMilT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG,
VOLK, supra note 32).
199. ld. at 131.
200. /d. at 136-37.
201. /d. at 134-35.
202. /d. at 139 (quoting RoBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 66-67
(1996)); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 571
(1983).
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to Schmitt do not adopt his conclusions. They see in Schmitt a novel approach
to problems confronting contemporary theory, and they seek to use his insights
to address weaknesses in liberal theory.

2.

Schmitt and the Internationaliz-ation of Law

Schmitt's writings on international law expand on his critique of underdetenninacy. Because Schmitt believed that international law could never
represent a functioning international political community, Schmitt believed that
no form of international law could ever win recognition as a legitimate and determinate system of adJudication. Consequently, Schmitt believed international
203
law to be either impossible or to be a mask for liberal imperialism.
As
Scheuerman points out, Schmitt's writings on international law suffer from a
fundamental internal tension. On the one hand, Schmitt criticizes the hypocrisy
of U.S. foreign policy and of international law as practiced through the liberal
League of Nations. On the other hand~ Schmitt clearly envies the successes of
204
American imperialism.
Ultimately, Scheuerman concludes that Schmitt's
writings during the Third Reich on international law were part of his attempt to
205
revive his career as the leading theorist justifying Nazi imperialism.
Schmitt's preference for the state system over intematjonal regimes seems
uniquely dated and should make him especially unattractive to the left. Despite
the horrific revival of 19th century style nationalisms in the Balkans and in the
forrner Soviet Union, developed countries are increasingly sacrificing powers
once considered inseparably bundled with national sovereignty in order to par206
ticipate in multinational treaty organizations and international regimes.
Carl
Schmitt simply does not speak to our time when he says "rationally speaking, it
cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the
friend and enemy antithesis, [and] that the distinction still remains actual to207
day .. ~ ."
The Hobbesian model of international relations that Schmitt adopts
cannot account for the European Union, for the World Trade Organization, or
for the remarkably peaceful way in which the Cold War reached its conclusion.
I do not mean to indicate that violent national antagonisms have disappeared;
rather, I merely point out that political progress can be made precisely by setting
aside the antiquated friend/enemy model that Schmitt recommends and that the
left-wing Schmittians seem to endorse. Whether the left-Schmittians like it or
not, the world does not seem bound to return to an age where states alone make
203. See id. at 141-73 (summarizing Schmitt's writings on international law).
204. /d. at 162.
205. /d. at 161.
206. For discussions of the extent to which national states have agreed to sacrifice their sovereignty and participate in international organizations, see THOMAS FRANCK, SoVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs

(1995); CHAYES and CHAYES, THE NEw

SovEREIGNTY

(1994).

Although the United States' federal system complicates its participation in international regimes, it
too has shown signs of a new willingness to participate. For a discussion of this development and
the continuing problems the United States faces in reconciling its dual sovereignty with participation
in international regimes, see the essays collected in DELEGATING STATE PowERs: THE EFFECT OF
TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SovEREIGNTY (Thomas Franck ed., 2000).
207. ScHMnT, THE CoNCEPT, supra note 17, at 28.
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politics and where politics is ultimately defined by the possibility of war. If
such a return were to occur, one can only wonder how the left would profit from
it.

III.
CoNCLUSION: PossiBILITIES FOR A NoN-SCHMITTIAN LEFTIST

CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

Ulrich Preu6 puts his finger on the peculiarity of the sudden love affair
some "political theorists identified with the Left" have taken up with Carl
Schmitt. Schmitt's "intellectual originality consisted in the uncompromising
and unrivalled radicalism with which he tried to preserve the values of nineteenth-century bourgeois order under conditions of mass democracy and its so208
I
cial and political struggles during the frrst half of the twentieth century. "
find PreuB' analysis persuasive in two ways. First, he identifies Schmitt's longterm political interests with materialist specificity. Second, he comprehends that
Schmitt's theories are time-bound and cannot be ripped from their proper context and mechanisitically applied to address the problems facing contemporary
209
liberal democracies.
Should we read Carl Schmitt today? I think law students and legal scholars
can benefit from his writings in a number of ways. First, Schmitt's theory of the
exception relates to a problem to which liberal theory has given inadequate consideration. Liberal theory recognizes that there are gaps in the law and that
decision-makers sometimes have to act in the interstices between clearly established laws. However, liberal theory has little to say about those exceptional
circumstances when the law may be suspended or where legal precedents cannot
properly apply. As John McConnick points out, here Schmitt poses the question, but his proposed solution, replacing parliamentary democracy with a dictatorship, is not one that liberalism can accept.
Second, Schmitt forces liberals to theorize the substance underlying our
political community. There is no need to define this community in tenns of
Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction, but the law ought to be an expression of the
political community that it governs. Liberal theory strives for tolerance and inclusiveness, but there are clearly areas, such as national security law and the
laws affecting naturalization and citizenship, in which the law makes crucial
distinctions between those who are included and those excluded from the polity.
208.
209.

PreuB, supra note 64, at 178.
G.L. Ulmen, one of Schmitt's most energetic apologists, shares Preu6' assessment:
The lessons to be learned from European constitutional crises always must be circumscribed and qualified by this fundamental distinction [between the continental European tradition of codified law and the English tradition of common law], even as one
must distinguish between continental European and North American concepts of liberalism and conservatism, both of which have changed over time .. In short, the crisis
of Gennan constitutional law during the Weimar Republic is a very precarious and
problematic paradigm for considering and criticizing either American or Canadian
legal and political matters.

Ulrnen, supra note 2, at 1121.
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Liberal theory would do well to take up the Schmittian challenge and justify the
principles of exclusion that underlie these laws. To use Schmitt in this way is to
work within the liberal paradigm and, as Mouffe suggests, to use an anti-liberal
critique in an effort to strengthen democratic institutions.
Such a project is very different from Schmitt's and from the earlier attempts by the left to appropriate Schmitt's theories in an attempt to replace liberal democracy with a radical alternative. While Schmitt's writings can be used
to inform a radical critique of liberalism, they make far more sense when read in
their proper historical context, which means, among other things, that Schmitt
must be read in conjunction with the German legal theorists to whom he was
responding. Not only does such an intertextual reading of Schmitt illuminate his
writings, it indicates his specificity and his limitations. Schmitt's constitutional
theory was a response to a genuine crisis in the German republic. It is important
to know why a brilliant conservative legal theorist came to see National Socialism as a preferable alternative to Weimar's imperfect republicanism. It is also
important to know that many of Schmitt's contemporaries saw those imperfections with the same clarity that Schmitt did but chose professional disgrace and
exile over collaboration with Nazism. The choices they made were not merely
personal; they derived from deeply-held beliefs about constitutional theory.
The left has nothing to gain from the abandonment of civility in politics in
favor of the brutality of Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction. This does not mean
that the left need accept modes of pluralism that are too prone- to degenerate into
unprincipled horse-trading. Rather, especially in the face of the over~the-top
individualism of identity-politics, the left must adopt a strategy of forceful but
respectful disagreement, not only because the left undoubtedly would come out
on the losing end of a politics of antagonism but, more fundamentally, because
-people on the left cannot demonize those who do not share their political views
without betraying leftist principles regarding the ontological equality of all persons. More specifically, Mouffe's recommendation that the left use Schmitt in
order to develop a notion of homogeneity that can form the basis for a pluralistic
demos seems especially inappropriate for countries such as the United States and
Canada in which the state has always been conceived as a political idea capable
of uniting heterogeneous groups. It is especially hard to apply Schmitt's emphasis on homogeneity in a country such as the United States, in which the independent judiciary serves to protect minority rights and to guarantee the rights of
citizenship to members of heterogeneous groups.
In the United States, there is an additional problem facing the left that is
quite different from the problem of underdetermination that Scheuerman emphasizes. The trend in federal statutes in the areas of criminal and immigration law,
including laws governing the writ of habeas corpus, is to establish very clear and
draconian rules and to eliminate- both discretion and, in many cases, judicial
210
These laws prevent the federal courts from
review in an Article III court.
210. See e.g., The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death-Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat 1214 (1996) (limiting the availability of habeas review in federal courts); the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.I 04-208, div. C, II 0 Stat. 1009-546
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performing their role as the guardians of the constitutional rights of protected
minority groups. Left-wing critics of legal indeterminacy must also confront the
fact that unjust laws that are clear and leave no room for discretion can also pose
a threat to the social values leftists seek to protect. Legal positivism may provide insights into how one might fortnulate a left-wing critique of recent legislative decisions that have curtailed the powers of courts to protect the rights of
individuals. In order to discover such insights, however, legal scholarship must
look beyond Carl Schmitt.

(1996) (rendering numerous categories of "criminal aliens" ineligible for discretionary relief from
deportation and largely eliminating federal judicial review of decisions committed to the discretionary power of the Attorney General).

